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Monetarism Is Dead; Long Live
the Quantity Theory
N OCTOBER 1979, when the Federal Open Mar-
ket committee adopted new oper’ating procedures
purported to be directed at control of monetary
aggregates, newspapers r’eported that economists
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis celebrated.
Many had been hired and inspired by Homer
Jones, its former research director, to whose mem-
ory this lecture is dedicated. The celebration was
premature.
‘l’hose new procedures wereacover for genu-
inel~’restrictive policy actions that reversed the
upward ratcheting of inflation begun in the 1960s.
It threatened to get out of hand in 1979. Such a
policy rever’sal was altogether appropriate, but, as
in earlier episodes, it represented an abr’upt shift
in direction made necessary because earlier’ policy
had taken the economy so firr ofi’course. Whether’
or not the Federal Reservegenuinely attempted to
control growth in the monetary aggregates begin-
ning in 1979, it no longer does. The reason is not
that it could not, hut that the r-ehationship between
growth in the aggregates and GNP, and in turn
inflation, appeared so unpredictable. Conse-
quently, in recent years the Federal Reserve has
reverted to manipulating open market purchases
and sales ofsecurities to hold federal funds rates
or free reserves within tar’get ranges as was the
practice from the 1920s until 1973.
In 1961, 500fl after leaving the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, Igave a talk there in which I
criticized Feder’al Reserve operating procedures
for focusing on free reserves orinterest i’ates
rather than growth in the monetary aggregates.
The Federal Reserve was characterized as abase-
ball player’ who can’t hit a curve. He s~imigsat
where the ball was, not where it is. The example I
cited was the experience in 19(30 when the Federal
Reserve persisted in tat’geting lower and lower
interest rates even as monetary growth turned
negative and the economy slipped into recession.
The Chairman of the Board of Governots of the
Federal Reserve in those (lays was William Mc-
Chesney Martin. Ite likened the role of monetary
policy to ‘‘leaning against the wind,’’ the idea be-
ing that money market conditions as measured by
interest r’ares or free r’esen’es would tighten during
business expansions and ease during contrac-
tions. In 1988, the Federal Reserve no longer tight—
ens, it snugs. Whatever the name, there isaprob—
1cm with this approach. Even if the Federal
Reserve takes no action, interest rates can change
because of changes in total spending in the econ-
omy and associated credit demands. ‘fEe r’isk is
that the Federal Reservewill attribute a decline in
interest rates, as ii did in 1960, to its policies when
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target, it sells open market securities and forces a
contraction in monetary aggregates. As a result,
interest rates are prevemited from falling as much
as ifno action were taken.
There are problems associated with interest rate
targets, but what about monetary targets? Mypre-
sentation todayaddresses whether’ the relation-
ship between monetary growth and GNP has be-
come so unpredictable as to justiI~’the
abandonment of mnonetary targets which seems to
have occurred.
MONETARISM AND THE QUANTITY
THEORY
Monetarism, the apparent heir ofthe Quantity
Theory ofMoney, was born in the 1960s. Not only
was the name changed but also the concept. Un-
like [he Quantity Theory, whose focus is on the
long run, monetar’ism was widely interpreted as
providing an alternative to short run Keynesian
model for’ecasts, aview not always shared by its
progenitors.
The Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis equation,
which explained quarterly GNP growth largely as a
function of monetary growth, became amajor’
monetar’isl forecasting tool.’ Its simplicity and
apparent reliability captured the one-dimensional
attention ofWall Street and Washington. GNP
gr-owth was estimated to reflect groi~4hin nar-
rowly defined money, Ml, in the current quar’ter
and the pretious year; and it was found to rise
about 3 percent a year’ independently of monetary
growth. With hindsight, we know that this stable
Ml velocitytrend was peculiar to the per’iod on
which the estimates were based, initially the 1950s
and 1960s hut then the unfolding 1970s as well.
The Federal Reserve flank ofSt. Louis model
went beyond the estimated GNP or demand
growth equation to incorporate potential supply
growth which together determined inflation and
unemployment, and a credit market which deter-
mined interest rates By the end of the 1970s and
into the 1980s, the weekly publication of Ml
changes became a major’news event and market
force because these data provided a basis for fore-
casts of total demnand growth, inflation and inter-
est rates.
‘fhe pr’oblem with the simplistic monetarism
that afflicted Wall Street and Washington was that
it accepted Milton Friedman’s dictum that in-
flation is always and everywhere a monetary phe-
nomenon but not his stipulation that lags are long
and variable.
My point today builds on this theme. Monetary
policy actions are appropriately directed at long-
r-unstability ofthe general level ofprices but not
at offsetting undesired short-term movements in
total demand, unemployment, or, for that matter’,
prices. I shall argue that we know enough to keep
inflation trends within bounds but not enough to
fully stabilize the pr-ice level let alone thebusiness
cycle. A corollary is that monetarism as a short-
run for’ecasting method should be buried; but the
Quantity Theory, defined as the predictability of
GNP growth on the basis of growth in the mone-
tary aggregates, should he recognized as the cor-
rect principle for controlling intlation in the long
r’un; and Federal Resetve operating pr-ocedures
should be made consistent with that principle.
SHORT-TERM FORECASTS
Let me make a few remarks about short-term
forecasts. None ar’every good for’very long. Based
on l-’ederal Reserve “green” hooks, Allan Meltzer
reports that the Federal Reserve’s record offore-
casting nominal GNP growth ayear ahead ovet’ the
period 1967 thr’ough 1982 had aroot mean square
error equal to about 60 percent of average nominal
GNP growth.’ Since GNP growth averaged about 10
percent a year’, the forecast err-or is 6 per’centage
points, indicating that one-third of the tinie fore-
casts would mniss by more than 6 percentage
points and half the time by more than 4 percent-
age points. Furthermore, and most important, the
Federal Reserve forecasts were way off track, miss-
ing avei-age gr-owth by more than 5 per’centage
points, the result of the Federal Reserve persist-
entlv underestimating GNP growth during ape-
‘Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, ‘Monetary and Fiscal
Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic Stabi-
lization.”this Review (November, 1968), pp. 11—24.
‘Leonall C. Andersen and Keith M. Carlson, ‘A Monetarist Model
for Economic Stabilization,” this Review (April, 1970), pp. 7—25.
3Meltzer, Allan H. “On Monetary Stability and MonetaryReform”
in Y. Suzuki and M. Okabe, eds., Toward a WorldofEconomic
Stability (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988), pp. 51—74.7
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nod of a r-ising inflationary trend. These striking
results are confirmed in an analysis ofFeder’al
Reserve for-ecasting that Karamouzis and Lombr’a
presented at the Carnegie-Rochester Conference
last month.4 They found that the Federal Reserve
for’ecasts systematically under’predicted GNP
gr-owth during expansions and overpi-edicted dur’—
ing contr-actions. Accor’ding to Meltzer-, private
forecasters have had a somewhat bettei’ record
than the Federal Reserve, but one still is talking
about er’rois of 4 per’centage points a third of the
time and nearly 3 per’centage points, half the time.
Since inflation is such alagging factor, changes in
nominal GNP gr’owth are initially translated into
real gr-owih changes. Hence, error-s of 3 per’centage
points or more in r’eal CNP growth half the time
translate into being unable to distinguish reliably
‘Karamouzis, Nicholas and Raymond Lombra “Federal Reserve
Policy Making: An Overview and Analysis of the Policy Pro-
cess,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
between aboom and a i-c-cession in either the
current quarter’ or ayear ahead.
Meltzer was mainly summarizing the perfoi’—
niance of non-monetarist for’ecasts, but one can
make at least as cr-itical remarks about monetarist
short-term forecasts in the 1980s. Like many an-
other forecaster, Milton Friedman’s record is
blemished. For example, he forecast arecession
that didn’t mnater-ialize in 1984 and an equaltv illu-
sory inilation in 1986. In 1988, not only Friedman
but other’s of comparable persuasion are worried
about the consequences of the contr-action in
monetary gr-owth in 1987.
I too am concerned, though it is worth mention-
ing, as Jim Meigs, an early colleague of Homer
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Chart 6
GNP/Money: Various Measures








reminded mne, that Homer was suspicious about
all short-term forecasts, including those based on
monetary growth. It was his persistent question-
ing that created the flurry of econometric work
about monetary relationships forwhich the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis became famous.
HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS: THE
BROAD PICTURE
The historical relationship between monetary
growth and spemiding confirms Jones’ suspicion.
Let me present some charts which put the experi-
ence of the 1980s in perspective.
Chart 1 recomds inflation in the United States
since 1907, with 1907—45 and 1946—87 plotted sep-
aratelv. The blue-shaded areas identifyreces-
sions. Quite clearly inflation was a lot mom-cvari-
able in the initial period, though, because of
deflations dur-ing i-ecessions in the earlier’ period,
there was no sustained inflation ti-end as theme
was in the second period.
Chart 2 plots the real GNP growth i-ate — a niea-
sure ofgrowth in the m’eal supply of goods and
services. Though it averaged about 3 pem’cent ayear
both before and after the end of 1945, the magni-
tude ofthe booms and busts was much gr’eater in
the eamlierperiod. Since real growth averaged
about as much in each period, itfollows that the
inflation uptrend in the second period was an
aggregate demand not an aggregate supply phe-
nomenon.
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Chart 3 presents the nominal GNP gr-owth rate9
Post-1945 Quarterly Log Growth, Seasonally Adjusted
— ameasw-e ofgrowth in nominal demand for
goods and services. Though mnost values are posi-
tive, there are some big negatives in recessions
thr’ough 1960. Since then them-c has been slowed,
not negative, GNP gm’owth dum-ing m’ecessions be-
cause we have had considerable inflation even in
recessions. In terms of proximate causes, Char’t 3
shows that slowed GNP growth has always been
associated with slowed i-c-algrowth in recessions,
and accelem-ated GNP growth with accelerated real
growth in expansions. i’hus, decreased var-iability
in meal growth imi thu post-World WarII period is
linked to less van’iahility in nominal GNPgrowth.
What about soum-ces of nominal GNP growth?
Conventional wmsdom to the contrary, the tinning
of govurmnent spending and tax changes is not
systematically con-related with GNP growth. ‘l’he
1980s provide agood example. Fiscal policy by
every measure was expansionarv, yet nominal
GNP growth contracted.
Chart 4 plots the ratio of nominal federal debt
held by the public to nominal GNP. Them-c is a
nominal deficit ifthe debt rises, but a real deficit
only ifthe debt r-ises faster’than inflation. An in-
crease in the debt to GNP ratio m’efiects the real
deficit rising faster than real gm’owth. The historical
recom’d shows that real deficits relative to real GNP
did not amoutit to much before Won-Id War’ I. Big
r’eal defk:its occurred in both World Wars, the
early 1930s, and since 1980. Since nominal GNP
growth accelerated in the wai-s hut decelerated in
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Chart 8
GNP/Money: Various Measures
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tionship. Fuithermor’e, in the 40years since the
end of World War 11, there have been nine busi-
ness cycle expansions and in only one — the cur-
rent one — did real deficits rise significantly rela-
tiye to GNP. Perhaps these official debt figures are
the wrong ones to look at because they do not
incorpoi-ate discounted values offuture entitle-
mnents and taxreceipts. Others might find what
they are looking for in these data, but I conclude
‘Ml includes currency and demand deposits: M1Aomits de-
positsthat pay interest; M2 adds small time and savings de-
posits, overnight repurchase agreements and Eurodollarde-
posits, and, since 1959, shares in thrifts and money market
mutual funds.
that there is no consistent relationship between
fiscal deficits and GNP growth.
Charts 5 and 6 piesent the growth rates of the
monetary aggregates: Mi, M1Aand Ma.1The rec-
ord shows that major’ incm-easesin GNP growth in
World War-s 1 and II wer-e accompanied by both
accelerated monetary growth and rising fiscal
deficits, and postwar- contractions in GNP growth
by the reverse movements. Nonetheless, ther’e ar-c
1910 20 30 4011
many instances when fiscal and monetary actions
pushed in opposite directions. This diver-gence
permits identification ofwhich is the dominating
factor affecting GNP growth. In the early 1930s, real
federal deficits ballooned but monetary growth
collapsed. So did CNPgrowth. In the 1960s and
1970s, real deficits grew less than real GNP if at all.
Monetary gm-owth increased and so did GNP
growth and inflation. In particular episodes, such
as 1966—67 when real deficits went one way and
total spending gr’owth the other, it was monetary
gr-owth that tipped the balance.
Charts 7 and 8 present the gm-owth rates in Ml
and M2 velocities. By definition, velocity growth is




















char-Is m’eveal how steadily Ml velocity incm’eased in
the 1950s through the i970s, and how magged its
changes in even’ other’ period. The charts also
show how Ma velocity remained largely ti-endless
in comupar-ison with Ml velocity which dipped in
the 1930s but then rose persistently after 1945
until the 1980s. Note well that in every i-ecession
both Mi and M2 velocities fell so that to cushion
GNP growth would 1-equire faster monetary
gr-owmh. In the worst m-ecessions, including 1981—
82, momietan’ gr-owth did not accelerate asvelocity
gm-ow-tb slowed; and in the wor-st inflations, includ-
ing the late i970s, monetary growth did not dc-cc-l-
en-ate as velocity speeded up. Hence, momietarv
gn’o%~4h has often been an ineffective countem-bal—
ance to moderate excesses in (Th~Pgrow’th.
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HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS:
SPECIFIC FORECASTS
William Gavin and I have been studying the
quality of quarterly GNP forecasts based on the
monetary aggregates. Though them-c am-c mtiany
studies that have examined the post-florid War II
period, we were inten-ested in a hm’oader historical
experience. Ourfocus was on out-of-sample fon’e-
casts — the kind needed to direct monetary aggi’e-
gate changes to achieve adesired GNP growth
path. Quan-terly GNP growth for-c-casts for- each
business cycle were based on estimates of the
relationship hetxveen GNP growth and four quay-
tenly lags of monetary growth for the three pn-eced—
ing cycles, that is,a modified St. Louis equation.
On the average, both Ml and M2 changes were
estimated to change GNP gi-ow’th roughly pnopor’-
tionally while velocity ti-ends were significant in
relating Ml but not Ma to GNP. Overall there were
15 forecast intervals for M2 hut only 13 for Nil
because there was no quar-tei-lv information about
the split between demand and time deposits be-
fore 1914. ‘the first forecast for Mi was thebusi-
ness cycle 1924:4 — 1927:4.
‘Gavin, William T,. and William 0. Dewald, “Velocity Uncertainty:
An Historical Perspective,” US. Deparlmentof State, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, Planning and Economic Analy-
sis StaffWorking Paper 87/4, November 1987. Gavin was an
economist at the State Department in 1987 on leave trom the
Federal Reserve Bankof Cleveland.
<There are many factors that influence GNP
gn-owth. Consequently, in our-single equation
models that n-elate GNPgrowth solely to monetary
gn-owth, we expected that shifts in the econon’m
including mnonetan’ policy n-c-actions to economic
performance would lead to biases in the forecasts.
For’ example, we expected that lower- inter-c-st mates
in a fon’ecast period wotrld decrease velocity and
m’educe GNP growth relative to monetary gr-owth.
To measure the effect of sttch shifts, we regressed
aver-age forecast en’i’oi-s on changes in imiflation.
intenest rates and real growth fr-om the last busi-
ness cycle in the estimation interval to the aver-age
observed in the forecast cycle.
As noted, there was alarge decrease in the vari-
ance offorecasts from the pm-e-1946 to the post-
1945 period. To account for’ such hemeroscedastic—
ity, we weighted observations b the expected
standaril deviation of the mnean forecast ermors and
then used ordinarv least sqtrares to estimate ef-
fects of shifts in inflation, interest n’ates amid n-cal
gi-owlh tm-ends on forecast error’s. Table I pm-esents
the results. ‘tile only consistent link to forecast13
er-r’ors was change in the inflation tn’end, not in ten’—
est rates, and not real growth.
Gawn and L also examined cross—countn’ cvi—
deuce. ‘the nc-suIts appear’ in table 2. We estimated
the r’elatiomiship between annual GNP gr-owth and
curn-ent and lagged Ml growth for’39 countries for’
the late 1950s through 1979. CNP growth forecasts
for’ each country were made for 1980—84. As in ot,mr
[/5. Lime ser-ies analysis, these cross—country GNP
fon-ecast error-s were stm’omiglvcorn’elated with
changes in inflation trends, even excluding out—
lien’s such as Bolivia, Br’azil, Mexico and Penn that
had huge inflation accelerations in the 1980s.
Why the consistent link to shifts in inflation
trends? Look at chan-t 9. It is apparent that wide
swings in interest rates over the business cycle
wen-enot closely related to Ml velocity moventents.
Fun’them-mom’e, since real growth aver-aged about the
same hefbn-e as after the c-mid of 1945, one cannot
attr-ibute the persistent mise in Ml velocity until
1982 to that sour-ce. Rather’, the rise in Ml velocity
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Chan-t 10 reveals a mnuch weaker association
between M2 velocity and interest rates and much
less of a tretid. The shift in the sen’ies is attribut-
able to a n-c-definition of Ma in 1959 to include a
van-iety ofnon—bank liabilities that wen’e not in the
l”riedman and Schwartz definition.
Chart 11, which plots only n-c-cent data, reveals a
close relationship between Ma velocity and the
Treasury bill tate less a calculated weighted aver-
age own-nate on Ma! tiepository institutions n-c--
spond to pen’sistent changes in market rates by
altering deposit nates, but, even when uncon—
strained by deposit interest ceilings, adjustments
an-c- not that quick or’ complete. Since the post—war
ratcheting up of interest n’atc-s reflected ati uptrend
in inflation, it follows that lags in setting (Ic-posit
‘Moore, George, Richard Porter, and Dave Small. “Modeling the
Disaggregated Demands for M2 and Ml in the 1980s: The U.S.
Experience,” Federal Reserve Board Conterence on Monetary
Aggregates and Financial Sector Behavior in Interdependent
Economies (forthcoming).
interest rates led to nising opportunity costs of
holding Ma balances and to increased Mavelocity
when inflation trended up strongly as in 1978—80.
In the opposite circumstances when inflation
trended down stnongly as in 1982—87, falling op-
portunity costs of holding M2 balances decreased
Ma velocity. Something similar was going oti in
ear-tieryears too. ‘l’hus, Gavin and Ifound that
shifts in inflation tnends, hut not interest rates,
were consistently tied to error’s in GNP gi-owth
forecasts based on not only Ml but also M2
growth.
Table 3 presents the average GNPgrowth fore-
cast errors for full cycles based on Ml and Ma
growth. Neither’ totally dominates the other
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Chart 11
M2 Velocity vs M2 Opportunity Cost Li
1960 1963
U, Standardized Values
the cur-i-c-ntcycle. Our-finding that forecast en-n-or-s
ane smaller- for M2 than for Ml or Mlk hut not by a
large niangin suggests n-ohustness to the choice of
the monetary aggregate.” We also looked at the
monetany base and found that Ma mnodels pr’o-
vided the best forecasts on average for both 1907—
45 and 1946—87.
Turning again to table 3, some forecast en-nor’s
are huge. Root mean squat-c- er’r’ons average 17 to 18
percent in the pre-1946 period, though only about
6 percent in the post-World War II per-iod. By the
standards tfiat Meltzer- discussed, such en’t’ons are
compan-able to Federal Reserve forecast en-ror’s in
the “green” book. An infen’ence is that attempts to
fine tune GNPgrowth by contn-olling either- Ml or
Ma growth would miss GL’JP growth tai’gets by
more than 6 percentage points one-third ofthe
‘For a different opinion, see Michael R. Darby, Angelo R. Mas-
caro, and Michael L. Marlow. “The Empirical Reliability of Mon-
etany Aggregates as Indicators,” Research Paper No, 87 (U.S.
Department of the Treasury, 1987).
time and by 4 percentage points halfthe time.
What was said about not being able to distinguish
boom fromn recession holds for- our for’ecasts just
as for the Federal Reserve’s. However, then-c- is a
difference. ‘[‘Ihe average forecast er-ron-associated
with our-simple n-elationship of monetary growth
to noniinal GNP gi-owth appear’s to be well under
the reported average error’s in Feden-al Reserve
“green” hooks that Mettzer repor-ted.
OPERATIONAL ISSUES
The operational question is what to do in the
short run to achieve a lorig-ren-m inflation objec-
tive. Suffice it to say than the Federal Reserve need
not imn out every wrinkle in monetary gn-owth to
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GNP~Growth tbrecast ErrorsAnnualRatesthPercentChange
Av*age forecasterrors Roottneart equateetrors Bu$hiess
cycles , M MIA ~, tvtZ DEST Mt WA_, SEST
t9S4 9274 18 01 M 103 96 M
9281t93$rt 9 10 t4Z 11 ‘IS
1933 1~38’2 18 5 Ml 1 26 MO
1936 19454 U 01 MR 1 6 184 Ml
Av*age
Pre 948 31 15 MO 77 ~f 0 MO
19461 184G4 88 47 18 11. MO
1954.2 0 fS Ml 10 78 Ml
1964 956 as 29 Ml 44 61 Ml
195a&-tsel 03 30 Mi 64
l~61,219704 2~ 0 Mo 4 0 MI
19719751 03 01 18 3 41 MI
t97&Z—1993-S 15 16 Ml a 40 45 Ml
19804—8624 28 48 7 182 11 11 85 MO
I9SS’I 981 86 32 2 M OS 49 43 MO
Merage
Post$946 01 05 Mi 62 67 MI
Ov relt
Average 10 0 MI a 91 MI
monetary gr’owth to real gnowth oser the medium gnowtti even as it tipplied funds to support ar rrI
ter’m to avoid the kind of disturbances thit shifts crating monetary gno~th which wa reflected in
in inflation trends ngcnder. 1he Iederal Resene ac-cc-lenating inflation higher’ tntei c-st mates, an
needs to adopt systematic operational pn ocedun c-s inc-n easing t elo ity trend and uncxpc-ctcdlv tat ge
to shift its policy tan-gets on the basis of obsen-vc d GNP gn’otvth. Could that sad c-yr Ichave been
deuations of GNP gn-owth from desired h-ic-Is. a~oided?
One wa would hate the F c-dc-tat Resc-r-ie set a Suppose in 1978 to pick a year the I edenaI Re
GNP gi-owth target cqual to long tenm real growth serve had aimcd at 3 percent ic-algrowth — the
plus an inflation target perhaps zero in the long long tr-rm aienagc — arid an inflation target 2 pen-
n-un but not unreasonably only a partial step in entage points betmi the 6.8 pc-ic ctit inflation in
that direction in any one period. fhc- point is riot 1977. target GNP growth for 19e8 would hate hr n
to set monetary targcts on tin, basis of short run 7.8 perccnt’ fon’ 1979, 5.8 pencent: 1980, 3.8 pencent;
forecasts of what neal and nominal GNP gnoi~ th is 1981 and thereafter 3 pc-iCent the long-ten m
predicted 1 hope I have made cleat-hots c-i r’or - average n cat gi’ovi th i-alt.
prone such forecasts an-c- — but n athei on the basis
of long—run real growth projections plus an in Fourth—quartet —us er—foun th quai-trr CP growth
in 19e8 was 14.8 pencent not e.8 percent. G’\ F’
flation goal riot a c-urn-nt (AP forecast.
growth stavccl high: 9.~,penc c-nt nn 1979 and again
Such a procedurc in the l9iOs would hate led in 1980. Inflation accelerated: 7.7 perccnt in 19z8
to very difterent results from tihat we got. Ihe 8.5 percent in 1979 and 9.4 per-c c-nn in 1980. Pant of
Iederal Reserve pensistently unden’for’ecast GM’ the problem was using telocitv hut the pmobleni
A somewhat similar proposal is found in Bennett McCallum
“Robustness Properties of a Rule for Monetary Policy”
Carnegre-Rochester Conference Series on Publmc Policy, Vol
29 forthcoming17
was compounded bc-c-misc- the t”eder’al Reserve
validated the inflation process by an open man-ket
policy that per’mitled monetary aggregate growth
ofno less than 7 pen-cent in any of those year’s and
by as much as 11 percent. Ft was riot distinguish-
ing between the wind it was leaning against and
the thrust of its own actions.
One cannot he cem-tain about velocity move-
merits in the shom’t i-un but in the circumstances of
the late 1970s with a rising inflation tic-nd, one
could have anticipated rising velocities. By what—
even’means the Federal Reserve might have chosen
to control its open mar-ken operations — tai’getitig
free reserves, feden-aIfunds rates, or- monetary base
injections — over the course of those years it
would have had to take actions to n-c-strict mone-
tary gr-owth to pt-event inflation from acceler-ating.
What was n-equin-ed in 1978, ifnot sooiier, was a
gentiiniet~mestnictive policy such as we finally got
in 1980—81. That policy anrived too late to avoid
enon-mous economic destruction. Inflationary
expectations had become enti-enched in market
contracts denominated in dollars. ‘The costs of
disinflation: the worst recession since the 1930s,
an oven-hanging lnmrden ofdomestic and interna-
tional debt accumulated on the basis ofmistaken
price expectations, and alegacy of uncertainty
about whether it might not happen again.
WHY NOT TARGET NOMINAL GNP
GROWTH?
It is my contention that putting a GNP target up
front for the Federal Open Market Committee to
aim at would allow it to mobilize its staff to design
the best wayto keep monetary growth and GNP
growth down when such a course is ohvioust
right as it was in the late 1970s.There is doubt-
lessly an element ofdiscretionary fine-tuning in
c;NP targeting, but with a twist. Deviations fr’om
the tar-get nominal GNI’ path should induce Fed-
eral Reserve actions to move monetary growth up
on-down in order to hr-ing for-c-cast GNI’ gr-owth
hack to along-run non-inflationary path. Perhaps.
them-c- should be some limit on how much change
in targeted GNP to be permitted in a particular
period. In any case, to avoid getting off tm-ac-k as in
the 1970s, the Federal Reserve has to direct its
considenab]e power-s toward controlling inflation
trends by actions that push monetany growth in
the right direction when nominal GNI’growth is
off tat-get.
CONCLUSION
To eliminate inflation tm-ends, monetary gr-owth
must he kept low on average and close to n-eat
gn-owth tnends. Extraoi-dinany inc-i-eases as in 1977—
79 or 1985—86 ought to he avoided so that offset-
ting dec-i-eases am-c- not necessitated; hut the past is
histony. What ahout the future? Cei-tainty we want
to avoid another cycle of inflation and disinflation.
liv tuck or design the Fedenal Reserve in 1987 and
early 1988 has pursued policies that are not so
different from what I have suggested. Monetary
aggregates an-c- gm-owingat about 4 percent annual
rates, close to appr-opi-iate rates to hn-ing inflation
down gradually toward zero. I would hope that
the lessons of history could he applied to stay on
such a path.
A positive i-c-formto make r:leam the r-esponsibili-
ties of the Feden-al Reserve n’egamding long-ternir
inflation would he to bring it into the fedeial
budget process. Etave it announce nominal GNP
targets each year’ on which to base Administration
budget projections overthe ensuing five fiscal
years. Both GNPgrowth and inflation are critical to
the budget with n’espect to tax receipts and ex-
penditures, pan-ticularly interest outlays. Why have
the Adniinisttation make an’bitrary assumptions
about GNP grriwth and inflation as it does now
when the Federal Reserve, whose power’s are so
important in deter-mining nominal magnitudes,
could tar-get such values and be held accountable
for attaining them? It should take responsibility
forwhat it can control in the medium term —
nominal spending growth and inflation — and not
play meteonotogist by leaning against the uncer-
tain winds of thebusiness cycle.
Can we devise ways to create the right incen-
tives for Federal Reserve officials to pursue poli-
cies to keep inflation low? The Germans and the
Japanese have. In contrast to their success in
keeping inflation low, we have gone through the
motions of having the Federal Reserve announce
monetary target ranges to Congressional Oversight
Committees beginning in 1975, and since then the
woi’st cycle of inflation and disinflation since
Wortd War II. Setting medium-term tan-gets for- GNP
growth as I have recommended would establish a
new n-esponsibilitv. However-, unless the monetary
authorities shoulder- that responsibility by taking
actions to stabilize nominal GNF’ gn-owth ai-ound a
medium-term non-inflationany path, nothing
would bc-gained. Establishing yet another target
i’ange would make sc-rise only if deviations from it
induced stabilizing policy reactions.18
Per’haps, the Fedenal Reserve must he put on a
shorter’ leash? We could speci~’a legal limit to the
monetary base that the Federal Reserve was au-
thorized to put into circulation in afiscal year-.
Budget authoi-ity is r-equired for’ theTreasury to
spend, why not for the Fedenal Reserve? ‘I’hen
again, it might be somewhat unn-ealistic to count
on Congress to check the inflationary tendencies
ofthe Federal Reserve. Aneven shorten’leash has
been suggested by Milton Fmiednian and not in
jestl. He would disband the Fedemal Open Mam-ket
Committee and hire a federal employee to pun’-
chase Treasury securities each week as specified
by law to keep some monetary aggregate on a
lorig-term zeno inflation course. Despite the
budget savings in his proposal, wide variation in
velocities historically suggests that we might do
hetter than fixing amonetary growth rate in per-
petuity.
The fact is that hm’oadty stabilizing monetary
policies have been observed on occasion in his-
tory. Even during the past decade, sonic countries
have managed their- affairs to avoid the worst ex-
cesses of inflation arid disinflation that we and
many other-s experienced. We can’t repeat history,
but we ought to learn from it. In the light of the
contribution of Fedemat Reserve actions to instabil-
ity in monetary growth, nominal GNP growth and
inflation, having it target a non-inflationary nomi-
nal GNPgrowth path oven’afive-year federal
budget cycle would be a step in the right din-cc-
tion. Responsibility for conti-ol of inflation would
he assigned to the institution that has the most
direct power to influence nominal GNP gm-owth
and, in turn, inflation. For nominal GNP targeting
to succeed in eliminating inflation tn-ends, how-
ever, Fedem-al Reserve officials must have the un-
potic~actions to get back to anon-inflationary
GNP growth path whenever the target is missed. If
they did implement such a policy, they would not
likely eliniinate all the ups and downs in the c-con-
oniy, but they would avoid repeating the most
egi-egious mistakes ofmonetary history.
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based on actual levels of the most recent series.
The original data used in the Gavin and Dewald study are
availablefrom the author on a LOTUS spreadsheet upon re-
quest with an accompanying 51/4 inchdiskette and a stamped,
den’standing and c-our-age to support the necessary self-addressed disk mailer.